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Dancing Around the Same Spot? 
Land Reform and NGOs in Zimbabwe –
! e Case of SOS Children’s Villages
K D Helliker




! is paper discusses the rural-based operations of an international NGO in Mashonaland 
Central province, Zimbabwe. ! e aim is to highlight the contingent variation of NGO prac-
tices within de" ned limits. It does this through ‘thick description’ of the NGO of focus, the SOS 
Children’s Village, and compares its ‘handling‘ of the transforming countryside with the re-
sponse of two other NGOs. It concludes by suggesting some conceptual points in understanding 
organizational dispositions of NGOs.
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Introduction
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the Global South exist in a social 
! eld that is marked by signi! cant tensions, in large part because this ! eld embodies 
contradictions between global and local processes. NGOs regularly seek to handle or 
‘manage’ these countervailing pressures in a manner that simpli! es and gives order to 
their world of ambivalence. Despite their lofty missions about changing an unjust social 
order, NGOs often avoid complexity and follow the route of least resistance. " ey seem 
more concerned about sustaining themselves as viable organisational formations than 
about forging ahead with sustainable development in marginalised or disadvantaged 
communities. Particularly at times of intense political con# ict at the national level, 
NGOs aim to maintain organisational coherence or to ‘weather the storm’ so to speak. 
" is occurs for example in situations involving dramatic struggles around land, such as 
in contemporary Zimbabwe under ‘fast track’ land reform (Moyo, Helliker and Murisa 
eds, 2008). 
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Handling tensions to bring about organisational stability is however merely a 
trajectory, albeit a dominant one for NGOs. Contrary tendencies also exist. Indeed, 
there is considerable temporal and spatial variation in how NGOs manoeuvre their way 
through their tension-riddled world, including with regard to land reform (Ghimire ed, 
2001; Kanji, Braga and Mitullah, 2002). Systemic ‘structures’ and contingent ‘struggles’ 
merely set limits to (or condition) NGO practices; within these parameters, there is 
considerable scope for alternative social projects. For instance, at times of embittered 
social struggles over land, some NGOs ‘constructively engage’ with the heightening 
tensions and ‘use’ these tensions in a creative way to animate and adapt the organisation 
to the shifting political terrain. Other NGOs are far more circumspect, either ‘feeling the 
water’ (i.e. acting cautiously) or preferring to avoid or sidestep the deepening tensions 
altogether in a ‘business as usual’ approach. " is diversity suggests that NGOs do not 
necessarily dance around the same spot.
In the context of the ‘fast track’ land movement in contemporary Zimbabwe, this 
paper discusses the rural-based operations of an international NGO (SOS Children’s 
Villages) in Mashonaland Central province from the late 1990s until the year 2006. I 
o$ er a ‘thick description’ of key processes internal to the organisation as the turbulent 
events of ‘fast track’ swirled around it. " is particular NGO made no attempt to alter 
its operations to ! t the transforming countryside; rather, it simply responded to crises 
on an ad hoc, unstructured and informal basis. " e rising tensions were not ‘handled’ by 
the organisation yet the tensions became embedded in the life of the organisation. " is 
became disabling for the NGO’s rural programme, and the organisation seemed to be 
moving in the direction of an implosion. " e process was further complicated by the 
historical legacy of a hierarchical structure that was ! rmly racially- and gender-based 
(controlled by White males).
" e major part of the paper entails a ‘thick description’ of this NGO’s ‘hand-o$ s’ 
(and potentially destructive) approach to ‘fast track’. I then brie# y compare the stance 
of this NGO to the (more proactive) responses of two other NGOs operating in the 
same province (and indeed same district) of Zimbabwe. " e comparison highlights the 
contingent variation of NGO practices within de! ned limits. " e paper concludes by 
o$ ering some conceptual points that hopefully assist in understanding the organisational 
dispositions of NGOs. 
Before presenting the ‘thick description’ of the NGO, I ! rst provide necessary context. 
I re# ect brie# y on some general theoretical points relevant to making sense of NGOs, 
and I then describe the contemporary politics of ‘fast track’ land reform in Zimbabwe. 
Intermediary NGOs – ! eoretical Re" ections
" e term ‘NGO’ is an inherently negative, residual and nebulous term that at times 
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seems to distract rather than contribute to meaningful theoretical debate. De! nitions, 
taxonomies and typologies abound within the almost in! nite literature on NGOs 
(Upho$ , 1996; Vakil, 1997). Often, sweeping claims are made about the character and 
role of NGOs, so it is necessary to demarcate the speci! c focus of this paper. In his 
seminal study of rural NGOs in Latin America, Carroll (1992) distinguishes between 
grassroots organisations (for example, local peasant bodies) and (non-membership) 
grassroots support or intermediary NGOs that forge links ‘between the bene! ciaries [of 
their work] and the often remote levels of government, donor, and ! nancial institutions’ 
(Carroll, 1992:11). " is metaphorical use of ‘levels’ highlights an important point about 
‘intermediary’ NGOs, namely, their in-between social ! eld or location. Intermediary 
NGOs have been provocatively labelled as ‘problematic organisations’ in that they ‘must 
live and work in situations of necessary ambiguity’ (Edwards and Hulme, 1996:260). As 
a speci! c kind of social form with particular organisational histories and trajectories, 
they occupy an ambiguous – and constantly negotiated and recon! gured – social space 
and are structurally located in a complicated ‘web’ of social relations as part victim and 
part maker. 
Intermediary NGOs are deeply embedded in contradictory processes of globalisation 
and are implicated in them. But whether in practice they act as ‘intermediaries’ (rather 
than say as ‘agents’, ‘representatives’ or even ‘instruments’ of others) is a contingent 
question requiring thorough historical investigation. In fact, part of the ‘! nely-balanced 
ambivalence’ of intermediary NGOs, to borrow a phrase from Morris-Suzuki (2000:84), 
is this tension – never resolved but rather managed in di$ erent ways – between their 
work as agents and their work as intermediaries. " e tensions that riddle the world of 
intermediary NGOs play themselves out in organisational practices that are historically 
speci! c and variable. 
" ere is considerable diversity within the intermediary NGO ‘sector’ in terms of 
political and ideological dispositions. Nevertheless, I would suggest that – generally 
speaking – intermediary NGOs valorise global processes of a capitalist modernising 
kind. " ese globalising processes at times enact closure, albeit unsuccessfully, on more 
localised and potentially empowering organisational and political initiatives. " is 
general trajectory of NGO practices is not structurally foreordained but is the outcome 
of indeterminate social processes. 
" is theorisation of NGOs is an alternative to functionalist analyses in which NGOs 
exist (for instance) in order to provide conditions for the reproduction of global capital. 
It also goes beyond instrumentalist claims in which NGOs are mere agents of capitalism 
working at the behest of (or even on behalf of ) capitalist organisations as part of a 
coordinated and cohesive ‘conscious conspiracy’ (Manji and O’Coill, 2002:579). NGOs 
in this regard are said to have ‘a hidden agenda’ (Monga, 1996:156) or at least to be 
part of a global ‘hidden hand’. As Crewe and Harrison (1998:89) note: ‘Donors [and 
their NGO “creations”] are sometimes portrayed as strategically wielding the control 
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they have over recipients for their own ends in a coordinated way to uphold the present 
capitalist system’. Yet, as suggested below, the NGO story may still be a ‘straightforward’ 
one based on the common view, as often propounded by development practitioners 
themselves, that the sheer ‘institutional survival [of NGOs] depends upon the status quo’ 
(Eade, 2003:xi). 
‘Fast track’ in Zimbabwe
‘Fast track’ (and the land occupations that formed a central part of it) derived from 
a complicated mix of three tendencies. First of all, there was the historical legacy in 
Zimbabwe of racially based landed property that remained unresolved twenty years 
after independence. Secondly, global agricultural restructuring and policy failures by the 
Zimbabwean state impacted on rural livelihoods and the desperate struggle for social 
reproduction. " irdly, a radical pan-African nationalism arose as a result of imperialist 
aggression, disinterest and withdrawal vis-à-vis Zimbabwe (Bernstein, 2005). Of course, 
these conditions neither made the ‘fast track’ land movement inevitable nor determined 
its historical speci! cities. But they do show that both global trajectories and local 
conjunctural events were signi! cant in the emergence of the " ird Chimurenga1. 
" e land occupation movement in present-day Zimbabwe, it is argued, is ‘the most 
notable of rural movements in the world today’; it has been ‘the most important challenge 
to the neocolonial state in Africa’ under neo-liberalism; and – controversially in the eyes 
of many ‘fast track’ critics – there are grounds for arguing that it has a ‘fundamentally 
progressive nature’ (Moyo and Yeros, 2005:165, 188). " is depiction of the " ird 
Chimurenga, most notably the reference to the progressive nature of ‘fast track’, has been 
the subject of an important but acrimonious debate amongst Zimbabwean Left scholars 
about state formation and political change (e.g. Moyo, 2001; Yeros, 2002; Raftopoulos 
and Phimister, 2004; Moore, 2004; Raftopoulos, 2005; Helliker, 2005). 
" e many critics of this depiction claim that it entails – almost perverse – value 
judgments made by ‘patriotic agrarianists’ (Moore, 2004:409) or ‘left-nationalists’ 
(Bond and Manyanya, 2003:78) who fail to conceptualise analytically or even highlight 
empirically the increasingly repressive character of state nationalism in contemporary 
Zimbabwe, designated as an ‘exclusionary’ nationalism (Hammar, Raftopoulos and 
Jenson eds, 2003), an ‘exhausted’ nationalism (Bond and Manyanya, 2003) or an 
‘authoritarian populist anti-imperialism’ (Moore, 2003:8). Raftopoulos and Phimister 
(2004:356, 376, 377) argue that this authoritarianism involves an ‘internal recon! guration 
of Zimbabwean state politics’ and now amounts to ‘domestic tyranny’, and they speak 
about a ‘number of African intellectuals on the Left’ who have ‘leapt to the defence of 
ZANU PF’ and its re-distributive economic policies. 
Regrettably, by way of this debate, ‘fast track’ is often portrayed in strictly dichotomous 
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terms. In this sense, existing analyses of ‘fast track’ land reform are one-sided and fail to 
do justice to the full complexities of the process. Such dualism means that the opposing 
moments embedded in ‘fast track’ are torn asunder through analytical abstractions that 
do violence to the contradictory and tension-riddled totality that constitutes ‘fast track’. 
" is dichotomous conceptualisation is evident with regard to various issues. 
First of all, the controversy is said to involve ‘competing narratives of Zimbabwe’s 
national liberation history’ (Hammar and Raftopoulos, 2003:17) such that, currently, 
‘history is at the centre of politics in Zimbabwe’ (Ranger, 2004:234). Secondly, the 
debate supposedly entails fundamentally di$ erent conceptions of the current crisis in 
Zimbabwe. On the one hand, a nationalist discourse speaks of a land crisis and stresses 
national sovereignty and re-distributive policies. In critically appraising this discourse, 
Raftopoulos (2005:9-10) says that land ‘became the sole central signi! er of national 
redress, constructed through a series of discursive exclusions’. On the other hand, a more 
liberal discourse refers to a governance crisis and emphasises human rights and political 
democratisation (Hammar, Raftopoulos and Jensen eds, 2003; Sachikonye, 2002). 
" irdly, the determinants of the crisis are painted as diametrically opposed. " e 
! rst discourse focuses on the external (imperialist) determinants of the crisis and the 
latter on its internal (nation-state) determinants (Freeman, 2005). For example, from 
a nationalist perspective, Mandaza says that during the late 1990s post-nationalist 
forces in alliance with foreign elements were engaged in a subterranean ‘social crisis 
strategy’ that sought to make Zimbabwe ungovernable, and that the (supposedly radical) 
intellectual representatives of these forces sought to prioritise issues of governance and 
democracy ‘at the expense of addressing the National Question’2. " e civic nationalism 
of these theorists (such as Raftopoulos) is portrayed as civil society warring against 
the state, and as seeking to undermine economic (re-distributive) nationalism rightly 
propagated (according to Mandaza) by a beleaguered nation-state under the onslaught 
of imperialism. 
" is dualist understanding is inconsistent with the theoretical points I raised earlier in 
relation to intermediary NGOs. " e seemingly dichotomous moments – such as ‘external’ 
and ‘internal’, ‘progressive’ and ‘regressive’, and ‘liberal-democratic’ and ‘nationalist’ – are 
in actual fact internally-related contradictory moments, and are invariably (relational) 
co-determinants of both the process and product of ‘fast track’. " ese contradictory 
trajectories adhered within and gave vitality to the land movement. Intermediary NGOs 
(as both victim and culprit) were ‘caught in the cross! re’ of these ‘fast track’ contradictory 
moments, notably the global-local contradiction. 
! e Case of SOS Children’s Villages3
" e world and work of intermediary NGOs need to be understood ‘from within’ 
through ‘thick descriptions’ of organisational practices; these practices cannot be read 
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‘from outside’. Con# icting pressures and demands that impinge upon (and within) the 
ambivalent social ! eld of NGOs are ‘handled’ through organisational practices and 
‘strategies’ that involve NGOs ‘negotiating’4 their way through their tension-! lled world, 
or even seeking to avoid ‘handling’ these tensions. " ese ‘coping’ practices, as suggested 
below, often have the e$ ect of bringing a kind of stability to the world of NGOs that is 
otherwise not sutured. " ese points are illustrated in relation to the case study of SOS 
Children’s Villages Zimbabwe.
! e Village Concept
SOS Children’s Villages International (called SOS-KDI for short) was formed in 
Austria in the immediate post-World War II period in response to the orphan crisis 
in Europe arising from the war. Over the past ! fty years it has expanded around the 
globe in an e$ ort to care for the needs of orphaned, abandoned and abused children. It 
operates in all countries in southern Africa. Its organisational structure in Zimbabwe 
is in many ways representative of its operations globally. SOS Zimbabwe is registered 
as a welfare organisation in Zimbabwe, and has been in the country since the1980s. It 
functions on the basis of the Village concept that has been the trademark of SOS-KDI 
since its inception. " e Villages are located within urban communities but exist as self-
enclosed, separate fenced-o$  entities. Normally, SOS owns the property on which the 
Villages are located, and this is said by SOS to express its commitment to remaining 
within any particular country no matter what political changes ensue. In Zimbabwe, 
there are three Villages: in Bindura, Harare and Bulawayo. 
Each Village consists of about ten houses that are run by a Mother and assistant 
Mother, both of whom are full-time employees of SOS. Each house has about twelve 
children, of both sexes and of many ages. " e children are wards of the state, and are 
referred to SOS by the Department of Welfare in the Ministry of Labour. SOS is thus 
legally responsible for the upbringing of the children. A male Director (until recently 
referred to as the Village Father) heads each Village. Each Director falls under the 
National Director at the National Coordinating O%  ce (NCO) in Harare. All Village 
Directors and sta$  are Black.
SOS youth are meant to leave the SOS system in their early twenties after completing 
some form of post-secondary education or training. With start-up capital, they are 
expected to ! nd employment or become self-employed. " e academically-gifted SOS 
youth go to university, and others go to various types of technical colleges. However, those 
youth who fail to pass their ‘O’ level examinations normally end up at what are called the 
SOS Vocational Training and Production Centres (VTPC) located on two farms ! fteen 
kilometres from Bindura in the Shamva District of Mashonaland Central province. " ere 
are about ! fty youths at the VTPC being trained in agriculture and engineering. 
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Vocational Training and Production Centres
" ere are three NGO projects (called facilities) at the two farms: SOS Agricultural 
Training Scheme, SOS Maizelands Farm and SOS Engineering. Each facility has a 
Manager and an Administrator. 
SOS Maizelands farm is a commercially run farm that was purchased in 1989 and it 
grows maize, soybean, wheat and bananas. It is expected by the NCO to turn over a pro! t 
(which it normally does) and generally it does not receive grants or subsidies from SOS 
Zimbabwe. Simultaneously, SOS Zimbabwe discourages it from seeking bank loans 
for the purchase of capital equipment as this goes contrary to proper NGO practice. In 
large measure, capital equipment has been purchased from pro! ts. " e farm itself was 
purchased for a mixture of reasons: to o$ er a commercial environment in which to train 
SOS youth in agriculture; to provide a temporary farmer settler scheme through which 
SOS youth would pass after graduating from the training scheme; and to provide staple 
food for the Villages. E$ ectively, the farm operates like any other private commercial 
farm in rural Zimbabwe. To any outside observer, and even to most of the junior farm 
employees, the formal NGO status of the farm has always been unclear. " e Manager 
and Administrator are White and are husband and wife. " e NCO now recognises that 
this working relationship goes contrary to good NGO practices of accountability but it 
has decided to let it continue. " e farm Manager receives an annual commission based 
on farm revenue and pro! t. 
" e Manager and Administrator do not consider themselves bound to the SOS 
Conditions of Service in terms of the salary scale in force, and they pay their permanent 
sta$  (about 100 sta$  members) considerably less than the SOS scale. About half (or 40 
per cent) of their sta$  have SOS contracts of employment but receive salaries amounting 
to 50 per cent less than the o%  cial SOS scale. " e other permanent sta$  (guards and 
irrigation ‘boys’) are contracted directly to the farm, and are paid according to National 
Employment Council (Agriculture) rates, which amount to about US$ 7 per month. 
" e farm has always justi! ed this type of arrangement on the grounds that paying their 
workers SOS rates (a minimum US$ 60 per month) would create problems amongst 
their neighbouring farmers and would make the farm unproductive. SOS Zimbabwe 
has over the years accepted this rationale. Besides the permanent sta$  (nearly all male), 
the farm employs numerous weekly or seasonal contractors (nearly all female), many of 
whom reside on the farm as family members or relatives of permanent sta$ .
At SOS Glen Avilin Farm there are two vocational facilities for SOS youth: 
an agricultural training scheme (ATS) and an engineering training scheme (SOS 
Engineering). Both projects have a Manager and an Administrator, and all are White 
except for the Administrator at ATS. " e long-standing Manager of SOS Engineering 
has always hired Whites as his Administrator because he believes that Blacks cannot be 
trusted. At times he has thought of employing his wife as the Administrator. He once 
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informally raised this with the previous National Director (who retired in March 2005), 
but it was rejected on grounds of NGO transparency. " e wife of the ATS Manager 
is the sister of the SOS Maizelands Manager, and there is considerable overlap (and 
indeed confusion) between professional and private lives at the two farms. " is situation 
has also led to the blurring of distinctions between public NGO goods and private 
employee goods. For instance, the wife of the Maizelands Manager operates a farm store 
at Maizelands (and pro! ts from it), and the wife of the ATS Manager regularly uses her 
husband’s NGO-owned vehicle for private trips. At times, these practices border on the 
privatisation of public goods. 
SOS Engineering has a large, well-equipped engineering workshop and it is supposed 
to run as a commercially viable venture. In the past it did signi! cant volumes of work for 
White commercial farmers in the area, including the building of ! xed assets such as farm 
sheds and repairs to moveable assets such as tractors and ploughs. More recently, though, 
it mainly relies on furniture orders from SOS-KDI for villages under construction 
throughout southern Africa. Over the past few years, because of reasons of political 
instability, SOS-KDI has put on hold any further Village construction in Zimbabwe 
itself. ATS has a more limited commercial side to its operations, primarily in the form 
of a grinding mill. " e VTPC Managers have constantly questioned the status of their 
facilities with NCO. " e ATS Manager has downplayed the (unpro! table) ‘commercial’ 
aspect of his facility so that NCO will continue to subsidise his vocational facility. " e 
Engineering Manager failed to do this, and now he is under intense pressure from NCO 
to commercially ‘break even’ in terms of operational costs. All major building construction 
and the purchase of ! xed assets at these facilities have involved grants from SOS-KDI. 
Both facilities o$ er a three-year training programme, and each has two training 
o%  cers. ATS has about thirty-! ve trainees and SOS Engineering has about ! fteen 
trainees. Most of these youths come from the three Villages but included are also ! fteen 
non-SOS (‘scholarship’) youths at the facilities drawn from other children’s homes in 
Zimbabwe. On behalf of the Villages, SOS Zimbabwe pays the training facilities an 
amount of US$ 4,500 per year per trainee. " ese facilities also receive the same amount 
for each ‘scholarship’ youth. " e training fees are meant to cover trainee-related costs 
incurred by the facilities. " e youth, who are all Black and mainly male, stay at hostels 
on SOS Glen Avilin Farm. 
Once the agricultural trainees ! nish their three-year programme, they move to the 
Avilin Tenant Scheme that is located on Glen Avilin Farm. Initially, this was meant 
to be a transitional phase for the SOS youth venturing into agriculture on a full-time 
basis after leaving the SOS system. However, SOS has never had a strategy or plan 
for integrating their youth into surrounding agricultural communities in Shamva. At 
the Scheme, the tenants are given one or two hectares of land for cropping mainly 
maize, soybean and cotton. Over a three-year period as a tenant, they are expected to 
become ! nancially self-su%  cient although they also receive considerable support from 
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Maizelands farm (for a cost) in the form of, amongst other things, tractor ploughing and 
agricultural inputs. In the end, they are expected to learn what it takes to be a farmer in 
the real (post-SOS) world. Recently though, and quite controversially, this temporary 
scheme has been turned into a permanent scheme. 
SOS Maizelands farm and SOS Glen Avilin Farm are located in a prime agricultural 
area. Up until the year 2000, the Shamva District had about forty White commercial 
farmers. Only a few remain. As well, communal areas are within a thirty-minute drive 
from the SOS farms, and two ‘old’ resettlement farms (originally settled in the 1980s) 
border them. 
! e Years Preceding ‘Fast Track’ Reform 
By the time accelerated (or ‘fast track’) reform emerged in the year 2000, SOS 
Zimbabwe had been operating in the Shamva district for over ten years. Yet, it had 
formed few if any structured linkages with the surrounding rural communities. Rather, 
these linkages were in large part ad hoc and personal. For instance, the White Managers 
and Administrators developed close personal ties with a number of White commercial 
farmers, and socialised with them outside working hours including at the Shamva Golf 
and Country Club. Indeed, prior to taking up his position at SOS Maizelands, the 
farm Manager was employed as a Manager by the White commercial farmer at nearby 
Nyamwanga Farm. " ese personal ties, and the positions adopted by the White SOS 
senior sta$ , came back to haunt SOS during the land reform programme. 
Also, as noted earlier, SOS Engineering relied almost exclusively on White commercial 
farmers for productive work for its workshop. As well, Maizelands Farm drew female 
labour (for example, to grade maize seed) from the communal areas on a seasonal basis, 
and would daily truck them in on its lorry. " ere was rarely any contact with the ‘old’ 
settlers, except when their cattle strayed onto SOS property and feasted on its crops or 
when SOS farm workers illegally cut down trees in the resettlement areas. Lastly, many 
rural people in the surrounding area would travel to the ATS grinding mill to have their 
maize ground. 
SOS Zimbabwe, and local management on the two farms, never saw any reason 
to meaningfully engage with the multi-faceted rural communities in Shamva in any 
conscious, direct or comprehensive manner. Such an approach never formed part of 
its organisational strategy, particularly given that its core business (and the centre of 
the organisation) was the Villages. SOS Zimbabwe, and in fact SOS-KDI, exist solely 
because of the Villages. " e VTPC were designed to serve that child-centred purpose, 
and to o$ er some kind of future to their youth who (without ‘O’ levels) would likely have 
no opportunities to further their education. In this sense, the VTPC had an inward-
looking policy and approach, and never felt the need to embed themselves within the 
broader agrarian communities. 
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‘Fast Track’ Land Reform
In September 1999, the opposition party the Movement for Democratic Change 
(MDC) was formed in Zimbabwe. Its leader, Morgan Tsvangarai, soon came to the 
provincial capital of Bindura to hold meetings and to drum up ! nancial support. He 
held a meeting at Insingisi Farm, just outside Bindura, and White farmers thronged to 
hear him. Many farmers publicly declared their support for the MDC and even became 
local representatives for the party in the area. A referendum on a revised constitution, 
which included clauses on land acquisition and the executive presidency, was to take 
place in February 2000, and the MDC was campaigning for a ‘No’ vote. In the months 
preceding the referendum, farm workers in Shamva were loaded and squeezed onto the 
back of lorry trucks by commercial farmers and sent to MDC rallies in Bindura. 
Most White commercial farms in the Shamva District were occupied soon after 
the holding of the referendum, although this was an uneven process. At times, speci! c 
occupations arose as a direct result of rallies held by the ruling party Zimbabwe African 
National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) in the town of Shamva. Base camps, 
normally headed by war veterans, were set up on the occupied farms. Initially, there 
were constant negotiations between Black ‘settlers’, White farmers and the District War 
Veterans (make-shift) o%  ce in Shamva about the status of the ‘settlers’ on the farm. 
" e ‘settlers’ made their presence felt on the farms by positioning their camps near the 
entrance of the homestead of the White farmer, by placing demands on the farmer for 
food and transport, and by at times forcefully preventing the farmer from ploughing or 
harvesting his ! elds. " e occupied farms were later designated for resettlement, and some 
farmers were still leaving their properties as late as the year 2005. " e remaining White 
farmers were able (for the time being) to secure their continued presence in the district.
" e two farms owned by SOS were never occupied, and it appears that there was an 
unwritten directive from government that they not be occupied. " e local ZANU-PF 
Member of Parliament, Nicholas Goche, intimated this to certain SOS sta$  in May 
2000. Yet, this did not leave the SOS farms untouched by land reform. For instance, 
some supporters of ZANU-PF set up a base camp on Maizelands farm called the Border 
Gezi Base Camp, named after the (now deceased) ZANU-PF provincial governor for 
Mashonaland Central. On special occasions, this camp would issue (o%  cially stamped) 
hand-written notes to SOS facility Managers, requesting contributions of various kinds 
(invariably transport and meat) for national celebrations such as Heroes Day. Demands 
of this kind also led Maizelands farm to contribute furniture (built by SOS Engineering) 
at no charge to a new secondary school in the immediate vicinity. 
ZANU-PF activism on the SOS farms also increased dramatically during the years 
2000 and 2001, and there were regular marches as well as meetings at which all farm 
workers were expected to attend. " e SOS farms were rumoured to be sympathetic to 
the opposition. " is was based on a claim by local ruling party activists that most of the 
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ballots found in the boxes at the farm election points after the 2000 parliamentary and 
2002 presidential elections were for the MDC. Numerous SOS workers were labelled 
as MDC supporters and at times were subjected to intimidation. Also, sta$  dismissed 
from work at the SOS farms on legitimate grounds (for example, theft) used ‘" ird 
Chimurenga’ threats to intimidate their superiors. " us, one dismissed employee at ATS 
organised a banner march on SOS Glen Avilin farm against the Administrator, and a 
former employee at SOS Engineering arranged for the new ZANU-PF-backed trade 
union federation (the Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions) to pay the National 
Director an impromptu visit at his o%  ces in Harare. 
Further, the Maizelands farm Manager allowed a prominent commercial farmer 
aligned to the MDC to stay at the SOS farm house when the latter was experiencing 
extremely di%  cult times at his farms. " e Manager also permitted farm equipment from 
occupied farms (notably from Nyamwanga Farm) to be moved onto the SOS farms for 
safekeeping, as this was designed to prevent the equipment from being taken by the new 
farmers. In time, settlers from Nyamwanga Farm came to SOS Glen Avilin Farm (along 
with the police and a camera crew) and removed what they claimed was Nyamwanga 
(and thus their) property. In the process, and despite being shown documentation on 
SOS assets by the chief Security O%  cer at the SOS farms, they took assets (for example, 
irrigation pipes) that rightfully belonged to SOS. 
As well, in 2001 the Government o%  cially designated SOS Glen Avilin Farm for 
redistribution and resettlement purposes. In response to a local appeal by SOS, the 
Provincial Governor wrote to SOS and promised that the farm would not be resettled. 
" e designation however was never repealed, although its period of enforcement has 
since lapsed. In December 2005, the Government listed SOS Maizelands Farm for land 
redistribution in terms of a recent amendment to the Constitution. " e farm became 
state land and there is no basis for appeal. SOS has the option of asking for a ninety-
nine-year lease on the property. In the meantime, a prominent Black farmer in the area 
who is also a high-ranking military o%  cial assured the Maizelands farm Manager that 
SOS can continue as normal in its farm operations.
In the context of ‘fast track’ reform, the SOS farms continued to operate in an inward-
looking fashion. " ey have been largely reactive in their stance, responding to speci! c 
pressures and demands as they emanate. No attempt has been made to understand the 
radical agrarian change that has taken place in the district, and certainly no linkages 
whatsoever have been established with the newly resettled farmers. If anything, VTPC 
management bemoans the loss of the White commercial farmers as a source of both 
business and friendship.
Organisational Dynamics
SOS Zimbabwe has its national o%  ce in Harare. Its long-serving ex-National Director 
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held the reigns of power from the year 1990 to March 2005. He is a former White 
commercial farmer. Although not a founder member of the NGO, over the years he 
without doubt stamped his authority and style of management on the organisation. 
" is had direct implications for the VTPC in Shamva. All three White Managers at 
the VTPC are also long-serving sta$  members and over the years they developed close 
personal relations with the National Director to whom they reported. 
In e$ ect, the Director considered the VTPC as his sole responsibility and he did not 
allow any other member of the NCO to interfere in the VTPC operations. For instance, 
SOS Zimbabwe for many years has had the position of Financial Controller located at 
NCO. " e ! nancial a$ airs of the Villages have always fallen directly under the ambit of 
the Financial Controller, and Village Administrators have reported to the Controller. In 
the case of the VTPC, the Administrators have reported only to their facility Manager 
and they did not have any structured relationship with NCO. " e current Financial 
Controller at NCO speaks about being ‘sidelined’ by the former National Director when 
it came to the VTPC. " e (White) assistant National Director at the time (now the 
National Director since April 2005) was also marginalised and his area of responsibility 
was strictly the Black-run Villages. He at times described the VTPC Managers as 
‘the three musketeers’. Further, the position of Human Resources O%  cer at NCO was 
created in the mid-1990s and a Black woman was appointed. Despite her protests, 
she was denied access to the VTPC and subsequently resigned. " e position was then 
abolished. For many years at NCO there has been an Education Coordinator responsible 
for, amongst other things, the (post-secondary school) academic and vocational needs of 
the SOS youth. Again, for reasons that remain unclear to the current occupant of this 
position, the VTPC have always fallen outside the parameters of this position. 
" is approach has led to the three NGO projects (or facilities) at the farms in Shamva 
being in large part privatised by the White Managers. " ese Managers have been given 
the leeway to conduct themselves and administer their projects in a manner that may 
not necessarily be in the best interests of the NGO as a whole, or that may at least be 
inconsistent with the vision of SOS. Intriguingly, the most junior of sta$  at the farms 
have noted this process of privatisation. In the eyes of many workshop sta$  at SOS 
Engineering, the Manager is seen to ‘own the company’. Further, after discussing the 
issue privately for many years, the irrigation workers wrote to the Maizelands Manager 
in 2006 to ask if they are employed by SOS, Maizelands farm or by the Manager himself. 
" is privatisation of public (NGO) goods arose and developed with the tacit support if 
not the active encouragement of the ex-National Director. 
" e Heads of Department at NCO, including the Financial Controller and the 
Education Coordinator, never directly challenged the Director on this score. Nor did the 
sta$  employed on the two Shamva farms openly question the facility Managers. In large 
part, sta$  felt powerlessness and feared risking their employment or the special bene! ts 
they received. " e ATS Manager in particular has used his position to give perks to 
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his key sta$  as part of some kind of patrimonial patron-client relationship. " is has 
ensured their compliance to the system if not their loyalty to him. In this regard, many 
of the relationships at the VTPC have been personalised. " is privatised and personalised 
system has meant that the VTPC operate as almost autonomous facilities (or ! efdoms) 
within SOS Zimbabwe. 
Even more striking, there remains no clear indication that the VTPC in any way 
contribute to the overall vision and mission of SOS Zimbabwe. In this respect, there 
is no record of any form of either external or internal evaluation of the three farm 
facilities throughout their entire period of existence. " is is a highly unusual state of 
a$ airs for an international NGO. It is also particularly problematic and perplexing 
given that the VTPC as projects within SOS-KDI are quite unique to Zimbabwe and 
thus constant monitoring and evaluation would presumably be critical to their overall 
forward direction. However, unlike the Villages, processes of evaluation have never been 
integrated into the organisational systems at the VTPC. Further, there is no monitoring 
and evaluation department at NCO to ensure that this gaping lacuna at the VTPC is 
recti! ed. In this context, it would appear that the VTPC have been deliberately shielded 
and protected from any outside investigation and interference. It is also highly unlikely 
that the VTPC Managers would welcome any monitoring and evaluation as this may 
uncover the many organisational dysfunctions that seem to exist at the VTPC. 
Organisational Dysfunctions
" e three farm facilities are NGO projects but, as noted above, they have been privatised 
and personalised. " ey are not consciously and intentionally run as NGO facilities, and 
there is no systematic attempt to develop a NGO organisational culture amongst the 
sta$ . " e ex-National Director gave the three White Managers extraordinary perks 
(compared to the Black Village Directors) yet they do not have a basic understanding 
of NGO theory and practice. In fact, two of the Managers have no formal quali! cations 
in any ! eld and the third has a certi! cate in tobacco farming. On the other hand, the 
Village Director closest to the farms (in Bindura) has recently obtained a Masters degree 
in business administration. " e White Managers have never sought to develop their 
managerial or NGO skills, and they normally avoid attending the managerial workshops 
organized by the Education Coordinator for all senior SOS Zimbabwe sta$ . In a sense, 
the ex-National Director granted them ‘protected’ or ‘sheltered’ employment, and they 
became increasingly entrenched in their positions. Despite the tremendous changes that 
took place in rural Zimbabwe since the year 2000, they stuck it out. " is is not because 
of some deep altruistic commitment on their part to the vision of SOS Zimbabwe. 
Rather, it emanates from their likely inability to obtain comparable employment and 
bene! ts elsewhere in the country; they continue to live in their ‘comfort zone’ and, 
besides, they have nowhere else to go.
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" is state of a$ airs has led to serious dysfunctions at the VTPC. I have already noted 
the failure on the part of NCO to properly evaluate the farm projects and the seeming 
disregard by the Managers for developing their managerial capacities. Beyond this, 
because the projects remain outside of the organisation’s standardised ! nancial systems, 
there is considerable ! nancial irregularity and asset mismanagement at one of the two 
training projects. For instance, numerous personal items purchased with SOS funds 
are hidden in the ‘trainee canteen’ expense account. SOS assets are disposed of on an 
unauthorized basis, often to sta$ . As well, one training project manager has a major 
stake in the building company that did most of the construction on the farms. 
Prior to his departure, the ex-National Director warned the VTPC Managers of 
impending changes likely to take place after he left. He highlighted in particular that the 
new National Director (at the time his assistant) might place the Financial Controller 
more directly over the farm facilities. One VTPC Manager raised deep concerns about 
this, and hoped that the Controller would merely implement an accounting function and 
not an audit function. In a similar vein, when a Human Resources O%  ce was opened 
at the VTPC in late 2004, the VTPC Managers insisted that the job description of the 
Human Resources O%  cer specify that the O%  cer report not to NCO but directly to 
them. For over a year, the O%  cer refused to accept this clause. 
Probably the most serious dysfunction concerns the major stakeholders of SOS, that 
is, the youth. " e VTPC do not have to formally and systematically account to NCO 
for the expenditure of training fees they receive, nor for the conditions under which 
the youth live and train. " e Managers at ATS and SOS Engineering wholly control 
the expenditure of the fees, without any input from the Training O%  cers. In so doing, 
the VTPC make a signi! cant gross pro! t on their training departments (if training 
expenses are subtracted from training fees). Fees meant for the training department are 
used for other purposes in an uncontrolled fashion, such that the training facilities are 
severely under-resourced and compromised. For example, at the SOS farms there are 
more than ten computers but only one has been assigned to the training department. 
" is is found in the o%  ce of a Training O%  cer, and the students have no access to a 
computer. " ere is also no library and recreational facilities are negligible. Recently, the 
long-standing canteen for trainees was converted into a number of o%  ces, and for over 
a year the trainees were served their food from the back of a trailer drawn by a tractor 
down a dust road.
On a regular basis, the Training O%  cers have raised serious concerns about these 
issues to the ATS and SOS Engineering Managers, but no discernable changes have 
been forthcoming. " e o%  cers, despite their strategic position within the VTPC, feel 
largely excluded from the decision-making process within SOS and they would like to 
see the involvement of the national Education Coordinator in the farm facilities. " e 
youth themselves, as the ‘target group’ of the NGO, are given few if any opportunities 
to formally raise complaints with VTPC management. In fact, they are in large part 
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treated by management as ‘objects’ of development. A participatory mode of facilitating 
‘target group’ involvement does not exist. But, through their (normally defunct) Student 
Representative Council, the youth have at times lodged a series of complaints and they 
regularly express their displeasure in everyday forms of resistance. 
" e Village Directors have also requested that they have an input into the management 
of the VTPC, considering that their youth are being trained there. " ey cite for example 
the case of the tenant settler scheme referred to above. In recent years, this scheme 
has been changed into a permanent scheme so as to become the kumusha (permanent 
rural home) of agricultural training graduates. " e ex-National Director put this change 
into e$ ect, and he spoke glowingly about it at his retirement gathering at the farm in 
March 2005. Some senior Black sta$  members at the farms refer to this as ‘a white 
man’s dream’. Indeed, the change goes contrary to the SOS policy that all SOS children 
be re-integrated into the broader community. From an original eight tenants in the late 
1990s there are now about forty tenants occupying small houses. " e land given to each 
tenant has decreased from three hectares to less than one hectare. For this and other 
reasons, the Bindura Village Director recently declared that his Village would no longer 
be sending any youth to the VTPC.
Agrarian Change and Organisational Standstill
At SOS Zimbabwe, there seems to be a serious discontinuity (if not gap) between the 
vision and mission of the organisation on the one hand, and organisational practice on 
the other. " ere is also considerable tension within organisational practices. SOS-KDI, 
and consequently SOS Zimbabwe, rests the legitimacy of its childcare interventions 
on its unique Village concept. " is approach to childcare may have been path breaking 
and respectable decades ago, but in the context of current thinking (even Zimbabwean 
Government thinking), institutional care is increasingly criticised for not being good 
value for money. In other words, institutional care is ! nancially draining and does not 
contribute to healthy personal development. Despite this, SOS continues to rest on its 
laurels so to speak by promoting the Village model, although at times (as noted earlier) 
in slightly modi! ed form as in South Africa. " e sustainability of SOS as a NGO rests 
fundamentally on upholding this model. However, despite its Tracking Footprints 
evaluation programme (which is meant to trace the career paths of ex-SOS youth), SOS 
has yet to systematically evaluate its childcare work in Zimbabwe. 
Presently, there is no basis on which the organisation can stridently claim that it is 
contributing in any signi! cant manner to sustainable livelihoods amongst its ex-youth 
as its most critical group of ‘stakeholders’. In this regard, the practices of the organisation 
may be contributing more than anything else to the sustainability of the organisational 
form as a site of employment for its sta$  (as another body of ‘stakeholders’). " e 
organisation may be more sta$ -driven than bene! ciary-driven. If ‘sustainable livelihoods’ 
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is used as a crude proxy for sustainable development, then there appears to be a marked 
tension within SOS organisational processes between promoting sustainable development 
for the youth and promoting a sustainable organisation for the sta$ . " is is particularly 
noticeable at the Villages. Despite (if not because of ) the fact that the Village Directors 
and other senior Village sta$  are clearly committed to the vision of the organisation and 
they show a keen interest in their children and youth, the tension exists. " ey continue 
to sustain an organisational form that may in the end be counter-productive to the 
achievement of the mission of the NGO.
On the other hand, the tension at the VTPC is more between organisational vision 
and organisational practice than within practice itself. Unlike their counterparts at the 
Villages, the VTPC Managers are at no level driven by the SOS mission and vision. 
In this respect, there is a near chasm between a publicly declared NGO mission and 
privately held motivations and agendas. " e vision and the practices seem to be pulling 
in opposing directions. " is has arisen for reasons outlined above, namely, because of 
the relationship that developed over a number of years between the NCO and the 
VTPC, particularly between the ex-National Director and the VTPC Managers. " is 
relationship, involving signi! cant autonomy for the VTPC, was never conducive to the 
formation of solid NGO values and practices at the VTPC. What is problematic at the 
VTPC is not simply the product of their work but also the entire organisational process 
through which this product is to be generated. In sustaining the VTPC through ‘fast 
track’ land reform in the face of considerable adversity, the Managers were not seeking 
to maintain the interests of SOS as a value-driven NGO but rather the interests of an 
organisation per se and their positions of privilege within it. 
" e VTPC Managers have in large measure been insulated from the insecurities that 
arise from ‘chasing donors’. In fact, the NCO has ensured that there is a regular # ow of 
funds to sustain the projects, either in the form of grants or subsidies. In this way, NCO 
has e$ ectively shielded the VTPC from the pressures of the ‘global’. At the same time, 
the business and personal links that the Managers established with the surrounding 
agrarian communities have focused exclusively on White commercial farmers. " ese, of 
course, have been signi! cantly disrupted because of land reform. Subsequent to this, the 
Managers have not sought to establish any organisational links with farmers in the new 
settlement schemes. " is disposition to distance the organisation from the transforming 
‘local’ was at one level consistent with the SOS youth-centred mission of the NGO 
and it also served, at least at ! rst sight, to stabilise the world of the VTPC. After all, 
directly engaging with the ‘fast track’ crisis was fraught with dangers even with strategic 
forethought. 
Simultaneously, though, the VTPC increasingly began to inhabit their secluded 
world, and almost became detached from the broader agrarian economy. " ey came to a 
standstill organisationally despite the winds of agrarian change. " e current dysfunctions 
within the VTPC exist not so much because of ‘mishandling’ the heightened tensions 
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(which mark ‘fast track’) between ‘the global’ and ‘the local’. Rather, the dysfunctions 
arose because of the ‘absence’ of seeking to handle any tensions in a constructive fashion. 
By adopting a ‘hands-o$ ’ posture vis-à-vis ‘fast track’, tensions and antagonisms built 
up within the NGO’s rural programmes. Unknowingly, the external tensions became 
‘internalised’ (or were ‘transferred’ into internal organisational processes) unmediated 
by any concerted attempt by the organisation to channel these tensions creatively. By 
failing to ‘manage’ these tensions, the NGO increasingly turned inward and moved in 
the direction of an immanent implosion.
Organisational Dispositions and Stabilising Practices
SOS Children’s Villages Zimbabwe is not necessarily representative of all NGOs in the 
country in terms of its response to land reform. As noted earlier, there is considerable 
variation within the NGO ‘sector’. In this last section of the paper, I seek to identify 
this variation by brie# y considering two other NGOs that worked in the same province 
as SOS Children’s Villages. But, I go on to suggest that there is a common tendency 
animating these (and ultimately other) NGOs; more speci! cally, contained in NGOs as 
organisational forms are dispositions and practices that serve to stabilise NGOs despite 
the turbulent world in which they ! nd themselves.
Farm Orphan Support Trust and Development Aid from People to People 5
Farm Orphan Support Trust of Zimbabwe (FOST) is a local NGO also involved in the 
child ‘sector’ in Mashonaland Central province (and elsewhere). FOST works primarily 
with farm worker communities, and ‘fast track’ had a profound disabling impact on its 
practices. For instance, instead of promoting socio-economic development on the farms 
it increasingly focused on food relief and other welfare-style interventions (because 
of the crisis of rural livelihoods). FOST was thus forced to channel its activities in 
a direction that did not readily maximise the achievement of its original vision and 
mission. " e lofty ideals for which FOST was originally established were sacri! ced 
in part or put on hold. In the meantime, the NGO seeks to sustain itself as a viable 
organisational form while also in some way remaining relevant to the needs of its 
‘targeted’ communities. Relief and emergency work does not equate to providing long-
term foster care schemes or to promoting the rights of farm workers. But it does o$ er 
a basis for the continued existence of the NGO, and this is particularly so considering 
the signi! cant donor backing that normally comes with such work. Indeed, it is likely 
through its relief interventions that FOST has been able to expand its operations over 
the past three or four years. 
" e social and organisational complexities on the ground in the ‘new’ settlement 
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areas (including authority structures) are recognised by FOST as requiring careful and 
considered study before engaging with them. " ese complexities have severely inhibited 
FOST from seeking to embed its foster care programmes within the restructured 
agrarian landscapes. Vigorously seeking to penetrate these areas may have severely 
compromised the structural integrity of the organisation during the current turbulent 
period. As it were, sta$  members at FOST were already stretched to the limit, and 
any further organisational demands may have simply demoralised them. But, despite 
the argument by major bilateral donors (e.g. United States Agency for International 
Development – USAID) that engaging with the ‘new’ farm settlements entails complicity 
with the Zimbabwean government, FOST has sought to enter these settlements on 
non-agricultural (e.g. orphan support) grounds. " us, in the face of accelerated reform, 
FOST has tried to ‘balance’ its development practice through ‘sensitive negotiations’ 
with both global donors and local power structures. As a result, it has been able to 
‘weather the storm’, and to manoeuvre its way through a restructured and tension-! lled 
agrarian landscape in a manner that has not seriously jeopardised its organisational 
integrity and sustainability. Unlike SOS, FOST has directly and creatively ‘handled’ the 
tensions between global and local forces.
Development Aid from People to People (DAPP) in Zimbabwe is an indigenous 
NGO that is linked to HUMANA People to People internationally. It operates primarily 
in the Shamva District of Mashonaland Central province. Prior to ‘fast track’, it owned 
! ve commercial farms in the district. In the mid-1990s it initiated a Communal to 
Commercial (CC) Farmer Programme in which communal peasant farmers would be 
taught modern commercial farming methods. " e CC programme was done with the 
full acknowledgement and support of the Ministry of Agriculture. It involved selecting 
a limited number of seemingly capable communal farmers and allocating them land 
on DAPP commercial farms. " ese farmers would live, work and be trained at these 
farms over a three-year period and would then qualify as (government-recognised) 
‘master farmers’, after which they could apply for resettlement as part of the government 
programme or jointly purchase a commercial farm with DAPP assistance. " e CC 
programme started at one of the farms in 1997 and the ! rst intake of farmer-students 
began to graduate just prior to the emergence of the land movement in 2000. 
" e government designated (for redistribution) three of the ! ve farms owned by 
DAPP, including one large 600 hectare farm that was purchased by DAPP in 1999 and 
at which the NGO had major plans to expand the CC programme. It is left with two 
smaller farms, one that houses HUMANA’s international o%  ces and one that o$ ers 
internal training for HUMANA employees who work throughout southern Africa. 
HUMANA senior sta$  members are all White expatriates, and they have a pronounced 
altruistic drive that emanates from many decades of involvement in NGO work. " eir 
development ideas and methods have a paternalistic thrust, as encapsulated in the 
notion that peasants need to be ‘made modern’. Yet, in the light of land reform, they 
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argue that Zimbabweans have the right to decide their own development destiny. As a 
result, and unlike most other development NGOs in Zimbabwe, they have not distanced 
themselves from ‘fast track’. Soon after their farms were taken, they approached the 
Ministry of Lands and asked what kind of NGO work would be appropriate under the 
altered political and rural landscape. It was suggested to them that the CC programme 
could now be implemented ‘on site’, that is, in the ‘new’ resettlement areas. For the past few 
years, and in conjunction with government agricultural extension o%  cers, they have been 
doing this on a signi! cant scale in the Shamva District. " ey are trying to instil within 
‘new’ small-scale farmers the ‘modern’ commercial mode of agricultural work and life.
Dancing Around Many Spots
At a civil society consultative workshop held by the Commonwealth Foundation in 
Harare in the year 2002, one participant depicted NGOs in Zimbabwe as ‘dancing 
around the same spot’ (NANGO, 2002:13). Potentially, this portrait has a triple meaning. 
First of all, it may mean that the spot never changes and NGOs have all their wheels in 
the rut. In this regard, it implies that NGOs are not learning organisations, that they 
function without strategic forethought and that they are inherently conservative (if not 
politically then organisationally). Secondly, the portrait may mean that NGOs prefer 
(or are constrained) to remain on an unchanging spot while all spots around them are 
constantly shifting. " ird of all, the phrase might mean that all NGOs dance to the same 
tune, although at times the tune (or spot) might change. In other words, NGOs have 
some sort of herding instinct or have the same shepherd, and hence they are invariably 
found pursuing common policies and practices. 
All three shades of meaning likely have some element of truth. But none, on its own, 
serves as an accurate barometer of the work of NGOs in Zimbabwe during ‘fast track’. 
Combined, the three meanings crudely ‘! x’ NGOs as static organisational forms devoid 
of all # uidity and diversity. NGOs in Zimbabwe are complex social phenomena that are 
constantly in motion and they are marked by considerable diversity. As a ‘sector’, both 
development and advocacy NGOs have not been particularly proactive in ‘handling’ ‘fast 
track’ land reform (Helliker, 2007). But speci! c NGOs have shown signi! cant adaptive 
capacity. Further, responses to land reform have been incredibly diverse, ranging from 
the ‘hands o$ ’ approach of SOS to the ‘testing the water’ position of FOST to the ‘gung 
ho’ approach of DAPP. 
To pin an all-embracing (catch-all) label (of any kind) on NGOs is highly problematic 
not only empirically but also theoretically. For instance, such labels fail to come to 
grips with the ambivalences and contradictions that invariably mark the world and 
work of NGOs. Generally speaking, NGOs seek to ‘manage’ and ‘negotiate’ their social 
world through a multitude of organisational strategies that often pull in opposing 
directions. " e organisational practices of NGOs are not necessarily one-dimensional 
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or unidirectional, and they are subject to signi! cant levels of ambiguity, # uidity and even 
confusion. " erefore, if NGOs are dancing, then they are more than likely ‘dancing on 
many spots’, and on uneven, unstable and shifting ground.
NGOs often ‘manage’ the ambivalences in their world by avoiding or simplifying 
complexities through speci! c organisational practices. In doing so, they try to stabilise 
their world. " e outcome of this ‘managed’ process is open to considerable historical 
variation. In the case of contemporary Zimbabwe, it has resulted in NGOs – as a general 
trajectory – creating ‘distance’ between themselves and land reform, both before and 
during ‘fast track’ reform. Prior to the year 2000, the distance was particularly telling 
at the level of advocacy. NGOs refrained from concerted lobbying despite a reasonably 
conducive environment for doing so. On the other hand, under ‘fast track’, there is a 
marked distance at the operational level, as development NGOs seem disengaged from 
the ‘new’ resettlement areas. Politics and ideology, and the con# icts they inspire, clearly 
contribute to the sheer complexity of engaging in land reform either at the policy 
or implementation level, and hence this distance exists. However, in the following 
comments, I privilege the organisational dispositions that drive NGOs.
Reproducing NGOs as an Organisational Form 
As noted, most intermediary NGOs in Zimbabwe, including advocacy and development 
NGOs, have in many ways distanced themselves from ‘fast track’ land reform and the 
newly resettled areas. But two points require clari! cation.
First of all, it is highly problematic to assume that acts of immobilisation or distancing 
represent signs of NGO incapacities and weaknesses. " e work of SOS and FOST, 
for example, point to organisational actions (and inactions) which seemingly indicate 
blatant NGO failure, such as the retreat from long-term development initiatives on 
commercial farms and the inability to become embedded within changing agrarian 
communities. Yet, such a conclusion may entail confusing organisational problems with 
organisational solutions. In other words, these organisational practices turned out to be 
(at least in the case of FOST) the NGO way or solution to weathering the turbulence 
of the contentious land reform in Zimbabwe, and to remaining as viable organisational 
forms under politically volatile conditions. 
Secondly, it is tempting to interpret distancing in terms of the (middle) class bias 
of intermediary NGOs, or at least in terms of their (apparently conservative) political 
and ideological dispositions. Again however this in large part involves a conceptual 
confusion and, in this case, between political dispositions and organisational dispositions. 
Distancing acts cannot be reduced to political-cum-ideological dispositions on the 
part of NGOs; nor does the overt pressure placed upon these NGOs by global donors 
provide a su%  cient explanation. Instead, it is critical to go beyond politics and to enter 
the ‘inside world’ of these NGOs. " is entails identifying the ‘internal’ dispositions and 
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interests that shape NGO organisational practices. 
In this respect, NGOs are disposed to minimise the complexities of their world 
through organisational practices, albeit unintentionally. Land reform is a particularly 
twisted and complicated terrain for intermediary NGOs, in relation to both advocacy 
and development work. " e existence of organisational dispositions that stabilise their 
world indicates that NGOs are not invariably against radical land reform or that, if they 
are, this stance is not to be interpreted in purely political terms. If NGOs involved in 
land reform do operate contrary to local empowering initiatives and thereby support 
global trajectories, they do so primarily because of their own organisational interests.
More generally, it is critical to understand why intermediary NGOs do what they do 
in a manner which is sensitive to the ‘inside story’. As raised earlier, intermediary NGOs 
as a rule do not work on behalf of global forces or at their behest, although there may be 
some empirical truth to suggestions that they do. For instance, even a cursory reading 
of recent documents produced by USAID leads to the instrumentalist conclusion that 
American foreign policy seeks to consciously and deliberately slot NGOs into its global 
hegemonic designs (USAID, 2002). It may also be asserted, with some justi! cation, that 
‘existing power relations’ within the development industry ‘distort and divert the best-
intentioned [value] approach’ of NGOs (Rowlands, 2003:6) and therefore NGOs – by 
some structural necessity – are subservient to global relations of domination. 
However, in reproducing global forms of domination, NGOs do not directly 
capitulate to powerful interests or structural demands in some unmediated fashion. 
Rather, the historically forged and contingent interests of NGOs tend to be consistent 
with the contemporary interests of capitalist globalisation, and hence NGO interests 
could be said to ‘complement’ these global interests. However, NGO interests are not 
abstract structural interests but arise as NGOs seek to stabilise their inherently # uid and 
ambiguous world. " ese interests do not entail brute material rationalisations, but are 
subjective interests heavily laden with meaning.
Conclusion
Intermediary NGOs negotiate their way in and through their social world, and this 
involves ambivalent, uncertain and (often) frustrating relations with donors, rural 
communities and the state. NGOs, although without conscious intent, resolve the 
tensions and ambivalences in their world by ‘! xing’ or ‘stabilising’ their own organisations 
even if this goes contrary to sustainable development (Brinkerho$  and Goldsmith, 
1992). " is explains in part why the development industry continues unabated, as a 
recursively self-reproducing set of global relations, although there is only limited if any 
sustainable development taking place because of it. 
NGOs structure, stabilise and enact closure on their world; in other words, as an 
organisational disposition, NGO suture their world and bring a simple coherence 
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and logic to it. " is may entail all sorts of simplifying assumptions and practices 
that undermine sustainable development and serve only to reproduce the status quo, 
including homogenising the needs of di$ erentiated rural communities or restricting 
their participation (and empowerment) to the bare minimum (Crewe and Harrison, 
1998:190-194).
In undertaking their development and democracy work, NGOs tend to prioritise 
‘the global’ and problematise ‘the local’. But, in the end, they over-privilege their own 
organisational stability and sustainability. Although they work within the con! nes 
of global forms of domination, NGOs re-centre the world of development in a way 
that gives primacy to their organisations. As Power, Maury and Maury (2003:87) put 
it, NGOs ‘set up internal but largely unrecognised barriers to their own values-driven 
goals’ so that the latter – along with needs of marginalised rural communities – are often, 
unconsciously, sacri! ced on the altar of NGO self-preservation. 
" is is how NGOs walk the tightrope of tension between the universal and the 
particular, and between the global and the local. " ey do not seek to reproduce global 
domination, nor are they manipulated to do so, but in pursuing order and stability along 
the social interfaces of their world, they by implication preserve the existing relations of 
domination. " is, though, is not an inevitable consequence of the development system. 
Rather, it is the product of the existing balance of forces within the development industry. 
Endnotes
1 Chimurenga is a Shona term meaning ‘war of liberation’. " e First Chimurenga re-
fers to the struggles against land dispossession by indigenous people in the early 
years of colonialism, and the Second Chimurenga relates to the guerrilla war leading 
to independence in the year 1980.
2 " e ‘Scrutator’ in ! e Zimbabwe Mirror, 28th April to 4th May 2000. Ibbo Mandaza 
is widely known to be writer of this weekly column. 
3 " e discussion on SOS Children’s Villages is based on my employment with the 
organisation from 1999 to 2006.
4 I use the term ‘strategies’ loosely and the term ‘negotiating’ broadly. " e term strat-
egy (if understood narrowly) would over-valorise the existence and signi! cance of 
coherent forethought and planning in NGO work; likewise, a narrow de! nition of 
negotiating would incorrectly imply that NGOs are invariably involved in formal, 
direct and speci! c negotiations. My use of the terms strategy and negotiation are 
simply designed to highlight that NGOs seek through a range of practices (some-
times intentionally, sometimes not) to cope with the ambivalences and tensions that 
mark their world.
5 Information for this sub-section is taken from Helliker (2007).
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